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Modeling Processor Market Power and the Incidence of Agricultural Policy: A Non-parametric 
Approach 
This analysis examines the interactions between market power and agricultural policy in 
the U.S. wheat flour milling industry. It  has two main objectives:  to assess if the 
payments trigger a change in the underlying economic behavior of the milling industry, 
and to estimate if the spread between the price of wheat and the price of wheat flour is 
affected by the policy regime, all else equal. Results indicate that wheat millers alter 
their pricing behavior when the program is making payments and are able to extract a 
rent from government intervention. These findings are consistent with a static model of 
oligopsony power. Theory suggests that government payments reduce the elasticity of 
farmers’ supply (Alston and James 2001). Consequently, the expectation is that, all else 
equal,  the oligopsony mark-down is larger when the policy results in payments to 
farmers. In this context, deficiency payments can be used as a natural experiment for 
identifying millers’ oligopsony power, similar to other policy measures (Ashenfelter and 
Sullivan 1987). Previous literature has tested for market power in the U.S. wheat flour 
milling industry (Brester and Goodwin 1993; Kim et al. 2001).  Results have been mixed.  
However, these analyses did not take government policy into account.  
Background: the U.S. Wheat Milling Industry 
U.S. farmers harvested 2.1 billion bushels of wheat from 51 million acres in 2007.  The 
total value of production including government payments was $13.7 billion (National 
Agricultural Statistics Service 2008). The milling industry displays a number of 
characteristics that are consistent with an ability to exercise market power  at the 
national level. The 4-firm concentration ratio in the flour milling industry is reasonably 
high, and has increased over time. In 1974 the top four firms accounted for 34% of total 
milling capacity (Wilson 1995). In 1980, their share had increased slightly to 37%, further 
increasing to over 65% in 1991 (Brester and Goodwin 1993). More recent data regarding 
concentration are not available for the wheat flour industry alone; in 2007 the four-firm 
concentration ratio for the entire flour milling and malt manufacturing sector was 56.6% 
(IBISWorld 2007). Wheat is one of the major agricultural support program commodities, 
and government payments are a non-negligible share of farm income for  wheat 
producers. For farms defined as primarily wheat producers, government payments were 
approximately 20% of average gross cash income in 2003 (Vocke, Allen, and Ali 2005). 
These numbers are quite dependent on the difference between the policy price set by 
the government and the market price; in 2007, average government payments equaled 
5% of the market value of agricultural products sold for these farms (USDA 2007).  
Some variant of a commodity loan program has been available to farmers since 
the 1930s.  Under a loan program, a farmer pledges a specified quantity of wheat as 
collateral for a loan valued at that quantity multiplied by the loan price. Farmers can 
repay loans at the market price when it is lower. The resulting difference is referred to 
as a marketing loan gain.  Alternatively,  in  some years  the farmer could choose to 
receive a loan deficiency payment in lieu of an actual loan. The policy price on which 
these payments are calculated is the loan rate. The relevant market price is the “posted 
county price” set by the government, which reflects market conditions in a county by 
adjusting major market prices for transportation costs and temporary cost differences.   2 
Methodology  
The structure of the empirical test regarding the millers’ margin is simple. Define Y as 
the millers’ margin calculated as the difference between the price of a hundredweight 
of wheat products and the price of the equivalent quantity of wheat, d as a dummy 
variable  defining  the policy regime (d=1 if the policy’s target price is above the 
procurement market price and d=0 otherwise), and X as a matrix of exogenous variables 
representing supply, demand and millers’ marginal cost shifters. The null hypothesis 
H0: E(Y|X,d=0) = E(Y|X,d=1)  
is tested versus the alternative hypothesis 
H1: E(Y|X,d=0) < E(Y|X,d=1), 
where E(Y|X,d) = f(X,d) and f is a function linking the exogenous variables and the policy 
regime to the conditional mean of Y. Rejection of  the null hypothesis is  statistical 
evidence that, holding everything else constant, the millers’ margin increases if the 
policy is binding. We interpret this result as a consequence of millers’ oligopsony power. 
We present a non-parametric approach that is able to compare the conditional 
expectations in the policy regimes even in the absence of information about the link 
function,  and without imposing arbitrary exclusion restrictions in the matrix of the 
exogenous variables.  Assume that the available information can be divided into two 
matrices: a T×S matrix of all observable exogenous variables (X) that may or may not 
affect millers’ pricing behavior and a T×1 vector representing the millers’ margin (Y). 
The goal is to calculate the conditional mean of Y without knowing which variables in X 
are relevant and without knowing the function linking Y to X. This approach addresses 
the two problems separately using a two-step procedure (Russo 2008). 
The first step uses a constrained sliced inverse regression (CIR) to identify the 
linear combination of the exogenous variables (the CIR factors) that are the best 
predictors for the millers’ margin (Li 1991). We collect the largest possible matrix X and 
use CIR to collapse it into a small (and manageable) set of factors. The model uses Naik 
and Tsai’s (2005) c approach, which enables the classification of the exogenous variables 
in the matrix X as possible shifters of demand, farmer supply, and/or processor non-
wheat  marginal costs  ex ante, using economic theory.  Formally, given  q  linear 
constraints of the form  A'β = 0(where A is the S×q constraint matrix), the constrained 
edr directions are given by the principal eigenvector of (I-P)cov E z | y ( )    , where 
P=Ã(Ã'Ã)
-1Ã and 
 A = Σxx
−1/2A. Here, the output of the CIR is dimension-reduced shifters 
(DRS) that are linear combinations of exogenous variables that summarize the effects of 
demand, supply and marginal cost shifters.  The use of this  dimension-reduction 
technique  eliminates  the need to  use  arbitrary exclusion restrictions  and specify 
functional forms in the estimation of the conditional expectation.  
 The second step uses  the  CIR factors as the independent variables in non-
parametric Nadaraya-Watson regressions (NW) in order to compare how the millers’ 
margin changes with changes in the independent variables for years in which the policy 
resulted in payments to farmers to those for years when it did not (Nadaraya 1964; 
Watson 1964; Li and Chen 2007). The use of kernel estimators does not require 
imposing assumptions about the unknown linking function. Consequently, it is possible   3 
to estimate the conditional means and variances of the millers’ margins under the two 
policy regimes. A simple test on the equality of means allows us to establish if the two 
estimates are significantly different. 
The logic of this approach is intuitive. The obvious methodological approach to 
estimating how the exogenous variables affect the margin without imposing specific 
function forms is to use non-parametric regression techniques. Yet if S, the number of 
possible exogenous regressors, is large, this approach is likely to suffer from the curse of 
dimensionality: adding extra dimensions to the regression space leads to an exponential 
increase in volume, which slows the rate of convergence of the estimator exponentially. 
In order to avoid this curse, the original variables are compressed into a smaller number 
of factors that are linear combinations of the variables using CIR.  
The link function F0 is estimated by regressing Y non-parametrically on the L 
linear combinations of X instead of on the S original variables.  Using the consistent 
estimates of the βs (instead of the true values) in a kernel regression does not affect the 
first-order asymptotic properties of the estimator and the error term has the same 
order of magnitude (Chen and Smith 2010).  The output from this step allows  the 
examination of how shifts in the significant SIR and CIR factors affect the millers’ margin 
in binding and non-binding policy years.  
Data 
The dataset contains information on wheat prices, flour prices, and other variables for 
1974 to 2005. Data are  deflated using the producer price index  (base  year  1982) 
provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The prices of wheat and wheat flour are 
those reported in the USDA’s Wheat Yearbook for two major wheat milling locations: 
Kansas City and Minneapolis. The price of wheat is reported in terms of the cost to 
produce a hundredweight of flour, and flour and byproduct prices are reported directly. 
The price margin is defined as the difference between the price of a hundredweight of 
flour and byproducts and the price of the wheat used to produce it. Table 1 reports 
descriptive statistics for these price series by market. The average real price margin was 
$2.14/cwt. of flour in Minneapolis and $2.10/cwt. in Kansas City.  
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for other variables. The data sources are the 
USDA,  the  Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Census Bureau, the Energy Information 
Agency, the University of Michigan, and the World Bank. Increases in the per-acre cost 
of fertilizer  (FERT),  agricultural  fuel  (FUEL) and hired agricultural labor (HLB) are 
predicted to shift farmer supply upward.  The policy price (POL) is predicted to increase 
supply when the policy is binding. Increases in hourly manufacturing wages (RHW), the 
price of gas (GAS), the transportation price index (TPI), and the bank prime loan rate (IR) 
are predicted to shift processors’ non-wheat marginal cost up. Demand is predicted to 
shift out as population  (USPOP), per capita income (USINC), wheat weight (WGHT) and 
protein content  (PRTN)  (as proxies for quality), the share of the population that 
identifies as Caucasian (CAUC), and per capita income in Japan (JINC), the largest 
importer of U.S. wheat during the sample period, increase.  A  Kansas City dummy 
variable (KANS) is included in order to allow for any location-dependent effects.   
The dataset includes a dummy variable identifying the years when the policy is 
binding (BIN); that is, years in which the policy price is higher than the market price. The   4 
years in which the policy was binding are defined using USDA yearly average data. A 
binding year (BIN =1) is defined as one in which  the average market price in that 
location is lower than the average “policy” price. The policy price is defined as the 
average yearly loan rate from 1996 on, and as the maximum of the average yearly loan 
rate reported by the USDA and the target prices of deficiency payments prior to 1996 
(before this date all production was eligible for deficiency payments so the program 
provided the same incentives as the marketing loan program). Because both the policy 
and the market prices vary over the sample period, one does not expect, necessarily, 
that binding policy years correspond exactly to those years with lower market prices.  
Results 
Table 3 reports the results. It includes the constrained edr directions and the t-statistics 
for each coefficient on the exogenous variables in each DRS.
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DRS and the policy regime.  The results allow us to examine the relationships between 
the three DRS and the policy regime. Figures 1 to 3 illustrate the distribution of the DRS 
over time, differentiating between binding and non-binding policy years. The figures 
show that there is a concentration of binding years before the 1996 policy reform, when 
the policy target price was relatively high. The binding policy years are not associated 
with particularly low or high realizations of the demand or marginal cost DRS. 
Realizations of the supply DRS tended to be lower in non-binding policy years.  
 Overall, the CIR performs 
well. The signs of the coefficients match predictions.  In the demand DRS, the U.S. 
population, Japanese per capita income, the share of the U.S. population identifying as 
Caucasian, and wheat weight have statistically significant coefficients with the predicted 
signs.  The Kansas City dummy has a statistically significant positive coefficient. In the 
farmer supply DRS all three input costs have statistically significant coefficients with the 
predicted sign. In the miller marginal cost DRS, wheat weight and wheat protein content 
have statistically significant coefficients. The costs of non-wheat inputs have statistically 
significant, negative coefficients, as predicted. The Kansas City dummy has a statistically 
significant negative coefficient.  
Figures 1 to 3 each plot the realizations of a single DRS for binding and non-
binding policy years. Thus, they do not address the possibility that binding policy years 
are characterized by interactions between the realizations of the DRSs that lead to low 
prices. Figures 4 and 5 examine this possibility. Figure 4 plots the policy regime against 
the demand and farm supply DRS. To fix ideas, years in which the demand DRS has a 
large realization and the supply DRS has a small realization appear in the bottom right-
hand quadrant of the graph. In a partial equilibrium graph of a market these points 
would correspond to market outcomes with relatively high prices and low quantities. 
For a given realization of the demand DRS, as the supply DRS realization increases in a 
partial equilibrium depiction of the market the price will fall and the quantity produced 
and consumed will increase as the supply curve shifts out. If the target price was 
                                                 
1 The signs of the coefficients in the farmer supply DRS are reversed relative to the conventional format of 
theoretical predictions in the table. This is simply an artifact of the sliced inverse regression approach and 
does not affect the economic interpretation of the relationship between the exogenous and the endogenous 
variables.   5 
constant, then binding years should be associated with high realizations of the supply 
DRS for a given realization of the demand DRS.  This pattern does not appear in Figure 4. 
Figure 5 plots annual values of the demand and marginal cost DRS. This figure does not 
demonstrate any predictable pattern between the relationship between the two DRS 
and whether or not the policy is binding.  Consistent with Figures 1 to 3, Figures 4 and 5 
indicate that high target prices are a more important determinant of the policy regime 
than market conditions are.   
NW Non-parametric Estimation Results 
The second step of the procedure uses the CIR DRS as regressors in a Nadaraya-Watson 
kernel estimator of the price margin with a cross-validation bandwidth. This step defines 
the link function and allows us to compute the conditional mean of the millers’ margin. 
CIR DRS. Figures 6 to 8 plot how the reduced-form demand, processor marginal cost, 
and wheat supply DRS affect the flour-wheat price margin. Figure 6 addresses demand. 
The estimated magnitude of the price margin depends on program status. For any given 
value of the demand DRS, the flour-wheat price margin is larger when the program is 
binding than when it is not. For both the binding and non-binding policy regimes the 
margin first increases with the demand DRS, then decreases. In both cases the absolute 
values of the changes are small. 
Figure 7 evaluates the effect of processors’ marginal cost on the price margin. In 
the middle of the range, the price margin is higher for a given realization of the marginal 
cost DRS when the policy is binding but the opposite is true on the extremes. When the 
policy is binding the price margin is virtually constant across values of the marginal cost 
DRS.  When it is not, the price margin first declines as input prices decline and quantity 
increases, then increases. Thus, for low realizations of the marginal cost DRS when the 
policy is not binding, the  result is consistent with Brorsen et al. (1985), who found that 
an increase in milling costs increases the flour-wheat price margin on a one-for-one 
basis. However, for high realizations of the marginal cost DRS when the policy is not 
binding and for all realizations when it is binding the outcome is not consistent with 
Brorsen et al. (1985). The results are consistent with the possibility that a change in 
policy regime triggers a change in pricing behavior. For years when the policy is binding, 
millers appear to absorb as least as large of a share of a marginal cost increase as they 
do in years when the policy is not binding.  
 Figure  8  evaluates the effect of farmers’ DRS of wheat supply on the price 
margin. As supply shifts out, the price margin first increases and then decreases in years 
when the policy is binding. In years when payments are not made the price margin 
follows the same general pattern, although it is much less responsive to changes in the 
supply DRS. These policy-dependent relationships between supply and the price margin 
suggest that millers’ strategies differ depending on whether or not the policy is binding. 
The  model  generates  a conditional expectation of the millers’ margin of  $2.02 per 
hundredweight of wheat when the policy is not binding and $2.25 when it is binding. 
The $0.23 per hundred-weight difference is statistically significant, with a t-statistic of 
2.5701 obtained via bootstrapping. 
  Overall, the analysis of the patterns obtained from the CIR-NW algorithm 
suggests that the data are consistent with a simple static model of market power. The   6 
figures suggest that millers are able to impose higher price margins in years in which the 
policy is binding. When payments are made, farmers respond to the target price, and 
are less likely to store their grain and wait for a higher price to be offered by buyers. 
This circumstance allows millers to exploit market power and reduce the price of wheat 
relative to the price of flour.   
Conclusion 
As a sector, agriculture is subject to a great deal of government intervention. Although 
expenditures have declined substantially in the past decade due in part to international 
trade negotiations, in the last three years Commodity Credit Corporation net outlays for 
wheat commodity programs have ranged between $0.7 and $1.2 billion (USDA 2010). 
Given the magnitude of these expenditures, there is an obvious public interest in 
efficient policy measures.  
  This analysis demonstrates that market power might redistribute the benefits of 
government intervention. It provides empirical evidence that U.S. wheat millers were 
able to increase their marketing margins on average by approximately 10 percent when 
farmers received payments through a marketing loan program. This expected increase 
in margins was computed controlling for the realizations of a broad set of supply, 
demand and processor marginal costs shifters in those years. In turn, these findings 
suggest that millers are extracting a rent from the deficiency payment/marketing loan 
gain policy. Thus, the analysis suggests that the general assumption that competitive 
models may be a good approximation for imperfectly competitive agricultural markets 
does not necessarily hold, particularly if distribution, as well as efficiency, is a concern. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics:  
Real Prices for Wheat and Wheat Products by Location, 1974-2005 
  Wheat Price  Wheat Products Price  Price Margin 
   Minneapolis  Kansas City Minneapolis  Kansas City  Minneapolis  Kansas City 
Mean  9.30  8.87  11.44  10.98  2.14  2.10 
Std. Dev.  1.57  1.51  1.64  1.43  0.49  0.24 
N. Obs.  32  32  32  32  32  32 
Source: USDA Wheat Yearbook 2006   8 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics: Explanatory Variables, 1974-2005. 
Variable  Definition  mean  min  max std. dev. 
FERT  Cost of fertilizer (real $/acre)  16.0  9.3  23.0  3.0 
FUEL  Cost of agr. fuel (real $/acre)  8.4  5.1  14.3  2.1 
HLB  Cost of hired labor (real $/hour)  3.1  1.9  5.3  0.9 
POL  Policy  price (real $/cwt. flour)  9.6  6.0  13.5  2.2 
RHW  Industry wages (real $/hour)  15.3  14.7  16.3  0.5 
GAS  Gas price (real $)  112.2  76.4  193.7  25.9 
TPI  Transportation price index  114.3  45.8  173.9  35.5 
IR  Bank prime loan rate (%)  9.0  4.1  18.9  3.2 
USPOP  U.S. population (millions)  251.9  213.3  293.9  25.3 
USINC  U.S. per capita income (real $)  4.1  1.1  9.5  2.6 
WGHT  Wheat weight (pounds/bushel)  60.4  58.4  61.6  0.7 
PRTN  Wheat protein content (%)  12.1  11.2  13.4  0.6 
CAUC  Caucasian share of population (%)  0.8  0.8  0.9  0.0 
JINC  Japan per capita income (real $)  90.6  56.7  103.8  13.3 
 














Coefficient  t-stat 
 
Coefficient  t-stat 
 
Coefficient  t-stat 
 
FERT  0.00     0.22  3.81 *  0.00    
FUEL  0.00     0.14  3.35 *  0.00    
HLB  0.00     0.71  7.02 *  0.00    
POL  0.00     -0.17  -0.59   0.00    
RHW  0.00     0.00      -0.88  -3.46 * 
GAS  0.00     0.00      -0.28  -3.28 * 
TPI  0.00     0.00      -0.79  -3.92 * 
IR  0.00     0.00      -0.48  -2.82 * 
USPOP  0.03  3.16 *  0.00      0.00    
USINC  0.03  0.30   0.00      0.00    
WGHT  1.96  9.95 *  0.00      0.85  5.16 * 
PRTN  -0.18  -0.74   0.00      -0.63  -3.82 * 
CAUC  167.78  12.32 *  0.00      0.00    
JINC  0.19  20.49 *  0.00      0.00    
KANS  0.95  3.79   -0.43  -1.67    -1.04  -5.19 * 
* Significant at 5% level 
   9 
Figure 1. Realizations of the CIR demand dimension-reduced shifter:  
1974-2005, binding and non-binding policy years 
 
Figure 2. Realizations of the CIR wheat supply dimension-reduced shifter:  













































D=1  10 
Figure 3. Realizations of the CIR processor non-wheat marginal cost dimension-
reduced shifter: 1974-2005, binding and non-binding policy years 
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Figure 5. CIR: policy regime and demand and marginal cost DRS:  
binding and non-binding policy years 
 
Figure 6. N-W Non-parametric estimation of the relationship between the flour price-
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Quantity increases  12 
 
Figure 7. N-W non-parametric estimation of the relationship between the flour -wheat 
price margin and the DRS for processor marginal cost  
 
 
Figure 8. N-W non-parametric estimation of the relationship between the flour price-
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Input prices increase Quantity increases